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I.

INTRODUCTION

Most individuals consider continued confinement to a residential
detention facility and denial of access to phone, mail, and family visits
to constitute involuntary detention. The majority of the federal courts
of appeal do not agree, however, and will not grant sentence credit to a
federal offender for time spent, as a condition of bond, in a "treatment
center" or "halfway house."' These same courts, without exception,
grant sentence credit to individuals who are remanded to these residential facilities after conviction.2 This inequity violates the purpose of the
Bail Reform Act of 1966 (the "Act"),3 which ensures even-handed and
1. The terms "treatment center," "halfway house," and "residential detention center" refer
to institutions to which defendants are conditionally released.
2. The Bureau of Prisons grants sentence credit to post-conviction defendants for time spent
in treatment centers or halfway houses regardless of the conditions of incarceration.
3. Prisoners-Credit for Confinement Prior to Sentence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 et seq. (1988 &
Supp. 1991); H.R. Rep. No. 1058, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(80 Stat.) 3288, 3288-90; Bail Reform Act of 1966, H.R. Rep. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 16
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2294, 2306 ("Bail Reform Act").
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uniform execution of sentences. 4 Congress sought to correct the inequi-

ties in the federal system for accused persons who did not make bail
and therefore spent a longer time in jail than an accused person with an
identical sentence who qualified for bail.'
The Act offers guidance to judges and magistrates in their treatment of pre-trial defendants by providing court officials with four options in pre-trial hearings. A judicial officer may: (1) release the suspect
on his own recognizance or on a secured or unsecured bond; (2) detain
the individual to revoke a previous conditional release or deport an illegal alien; (3) detain the suspect until his trial; or (4) release the individual on a "conditional release," subject to certain specified
requirements.6
The United States Attorney General may give sentence credit for
pre-trial detention under 18 U.S.C. Section 3585(b).7 Defendants may
file requests for credit for pre-trial detention with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)8 and the Attorney General.9 The Attorney General decides

whether to grant credit after defendants begin serving their sentences.
The decision to award or to withhold credit generally is straightforward.
Suspects who are unconditionally released or released on bond must
serve their full sentences. Alternatively, suspects detained by order of
the court because they pose a danger to society or because they might
4. Bail Reform Act at 16. Legislative history indicates that Congress passed the Act in response to the inequities arising when one individual could not make bail and was remanded to
federal facilities.
5. See note 4. Before passage of the Act, individuals incarcerated before trial did not receive
sentence credit for time served prior to conviction.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3142. This section provides that the decision whether to release or detain the
defendant should be based on the officer's perception of the risk that the defendant poses to society. Id. If the officer determines that the accused is likely to commit additional crimes if released,
then the need to protect the community becomes sufficiently compelling to justify detention. Id.
Otherwise, the officer is advised to set a bail that will ensure the individual's presence at trial but
that also will enable the defendant to enjoy his freedom until trial. Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, Title I, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.), 3182, 3190-91 ("Crime Act").
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). In United States v. Wilson, 112 S. Ct. 1351 (1992), the Supreme
Court ruled that only the Attorney General was empowered to grant sentence credit for pre-trial
detention. The Court ruled that the judiciary did not have concurrent jurisdiction to grant such
credit. Id. at 1354.
8. See 28 C.F.R. 542.10-.16 (1987) (outlining the entire appeal process). The Bureau of Prisons, a government agency headed by the Attorney General, is empowered to grant sentence credit
for pre-trial detention to defendants. 28 C.F.R. § 0.96 (1989). The Bureau of Prisons has adopted a
policy denying credit to all individuals released to residential detention facilities. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3152-3154. For the text of the Bureau of Prisons' statement, see note 141.
9. 28 C.F.R. § 0.96(c). The Attorney General delegated all power regarding the determination of places of confinement to the Bureau of Prisons.
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flee before trial receive sentence credit for the time served while incarcerated and awaiting trial. 10
The circuit courts are split, however, as to whether conditionally
released defendants deserve sentence credit for the time they are remanded to treatment facilities or halfway houses." Judges may be
tempted to use the conditional release program to protect the public
and as a response to the prison overcrowding problem. By releasing the
defendants subject to numerous restraints as specified in 18 U.S.C. Section 3142(c)(1), the judges serve both goals." Under the conditional release programs considered in this Note, defendants are released from
jail if they agree to remain in, and abide by, the rules of a treatment
center until trial. When the Attorney General has not granted sentence
credit, many defendants have filed habeas corpus petitions seeking sentence credit for their time spent in treatment facilities.' 3
Section 3585(b) of Title 18 mandates that credit be given to de4
fendants for time served "in official detention" prior to sentencing.'
The circuit courts' analyses of Section 3585 determines whether defend10. For example, if the individual was detained in jail for 30 days prior to a federal conviction, that 30 days would be applied against the imposed sentence. An individual sentenced to 180
days would be detained for, at most, another 150 days.
11. Although the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have granted credit, see
Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1990), and Johnson v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1334 (11th Cir.
1983), most other circuit courts have denied similar petitions without consistent rationales. See
Randall v. Whelan, 938 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.
1989); Ramsey v. Brennan,878 F.2d 995 (7th Cir. 1989); Moreland v. United States, 968 F.2d 655
(8th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1989).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1). This subsection states that if the judicial officer determines that
releasing the defendant on his own recognizance will decrease the safety of the community or the
probability of the individual's appearance at trial, the officer must condition the defendant's release. Id. Conditional releases vary from being highly restrictive on the individual's freedom to
requiring simply that the individual remain in the custody of another or report periodically to a
specified law enforcement official. Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i-xiv). The legislative history of § 3142 cautions that the restrictive conditions to be imposed must be justified by a need to protect society or
to ensure the defendant's presence at trial. Crime Act at 3197. The officers are advised to "weigh
each of the discretionary conditions separately with reference to the characteristics and circumstances of the defendant before him and to the offense charged ... ." Id.
13. See, for example, United States v. Insley, 927 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1991). See also Randall,
938 F.2d 522.
14. Section 3585(b) governs sentence credit for time spent in detention prior to conviction
and provides as follows: "A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences..
*

."

(emphasis added).

This section replaced 18 U.S.C. § 3568, which previously governed sentence credit. Section
3568 provided: "The Attorney General shall give any person [convicted of an offense] credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts
for which sentence was imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1966) (repealed 1987) (emphasis added). Although some courts disagree, most have held that the change in the language from "in custody" to
"in official detention" is irrelevant for purposes of interpreting sentence credit. See Woods, 888
F.2d at 655. But see note 11 and accompanying text. The change to "in official detention" accom-
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ants will receive sentence credit for time spent in a residential facility
as a condition of bond. Circuit courts typically consider at least one of
the following factors in deciding whether a defendant should receive
sentence credit: (1) the degree of restraint and the conditions of the
defendant's incarceration, (2) the BOP's statement precluding sentence
credit for pre-trial incarceration, and (3) the results that a Fifth
Amendment equal protection analysis would render. Although the federal courts of appeals use the same set of criteria for evaluation, they
disagree about whether a federal offender may receive credit for time
spent in a treatment center or halfway house as a condition of bond.15
Most circuit courts deny credit, although with inconsistent rationales, 16 even though the individual's liberty is significantly infringed.
These courts offer at least three justifications for the denial: (1) "official
detention" in Section 3585 refers only to custody of the Attorney General, (2) the conditions of confinement in a residential facility are not17
sufficiently similar to incarceration and therefore do not merit credit,
and (3) the BOP's statement precludes sentence credit if the defendant
is not confined to jail and prevents any additional analysis by the
courts.,8
By contrast, in its 1989 decision Brown v. Rison, 9 the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the reasoning of the other circuits and granted
sentence credit for time spent in a community center prior to trial. In
reaching its decision, the Brown court examined the then-applicable
statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 3568;2o the conditions of Brown's detention;2 1
and the BOP's position on sentence credit. 22 The Brown court ultipanied the Crime Act (cited in note 6), which was meant to achieve uniform and even-handed
sentencing.
15. Of the federal courts of appeals, only the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have granted sentence credit; however, the District Court for the District of Columbia also has awarded credit. See
Brown, 895 F.2d 533 (holding that conditions at a treatment center were sufficiently close to incarceration to warrant sentence credit); Johnson, 696 F.2d 1334 (finding that post-sentence inmates
in the same facility received credit for time served and holding that denial of the same credit to
pre-sentence detainees violates the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause). Even though the
defendant in Johnson received sentence credit, the court limited its holding to the specific facts of
the case because the state failed to present evidence at trial that the defendant was not similarly
situated to post-sentence detainees. Id. at 1338-40. The court left open the possibility that credit
would be denied in the future if the government carried its burden of presenting a rational reason
for the disparate treatment. Id. See also United States v. Davis, 763 F. Supp. 638 (D.D.C. 1991).
16. See note 11 and accompanying text.
17. Woods, 888 F.2d at 653.
18. See Ramsey, 878 F.2d at 996. See also Randall, 938 F.2d at 525.
19. 895 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1990).
20. Id. at 535-36. The Brown decision came down before the change in statutory language
referred to in note 14. As discussed in the text accompanying that note, however, the change in
language did not alter the Ninth Circuit's approach to credit.
21. Id. at 536.
22. Id. at 537 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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mately based its decision on the degree of restraint imposed on the defendant while he was at the center.2 3 Brown was detained for 306 days,
was required to be at the center between 7 p.m. and 5 a.m. every day
24
and was denied all contact with the outside world while at the center.
He also was subjected to drug testing, employment requirements, and
travel restrictions.2 The Ninth Circuit stated that these restraints on
his liberty constituted "custody" and merited sentence credit under 18
U.S.C. Section 3568.26 Federal courts in the Ninth Circuit continue to
grant sentence credit to individuals who are conditionally released to
2
residential detention facilities.
The current split in the jurisdictions results in unequal treatment
for individuals who are incarcerated under similar conditions. Although
incarceration might be merited, defendants have the right to expect
that their period of incarceration will not be based on which court has
jurisdiction over their appeal. 28 To ensure equitable application of sen29
tence credit under Section 3585 and to fulfill the Bail Reform Act's
original goal of uniform and even-handed sentencing, the United States
Supreme Court should determine what types of pre-trial conditional release programs, if any, merit sentence credit.
This Note addresses the question of whether and under what circumstances defendants deserve sentence credit when confined to residential facilities as a condition of bond. Part II discusses the various
interpretations of 18 U.S.C. Section 3585 advanced by the circuit courts
to deny or grant credit for time spent in residential facilities. These
various interpretations indicate that Supreme Court intervention is
necessary to provide the circuit courts with a uniform definition of "in
official detention" and a unified interpretation of the statute. Part III
examines other relevant factors that the courts consider when deciding
whether to grant or deny sentence credit. Arguably, the most important
consideration in determining what constitutes "in official detention" is
23. Id. at 536.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See United States v. Mori, 798 F. Supp. 629 (D. Haw. 1992). See also Mills v. Taylor, 967
F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1992). Although the Ninth Circuit's decisions suggest that the circuit uses a
balancing test to determine if the conditions of incarceration merit sentence credit, all the recent
decisions in that circuit have granted credit to all individuals confined to residential facilities,
regardless of the conditions of confinement. This approach is unwise because courts should use a
balancing approach to determine whether the restraints on an individual significantly impinge his
freedom and warrant sentence credit.
28. Under the present system, a defendant who commits a crime in the Ninth Circuit and
spends time in the treatment center will receive credit toward the ultimate sentence, whereas defendants in the other circuits will not receive credit for this time.
29. See Bail Reform Act at 16 (cited in note 3).
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whether the defendant's liberty is sufficiently impinged by the release
conditions to warrant sentence credit. Additionally, Part III argues that
several courts' interpretations of the BOP's statement regarding sentence credit are unreasonable and create an equal protection violation.
Part IV suggests that current prison conditions require immediate attention and that innovative approaches to incarceration that will protect the public without violating defendants' constitutional rights need
to be developed. Finally, Part V criticizes the current ad hoc approach
taken by the courts in granting sentence credit. The Supreme Court
should adopt the balancing test articulated by the Ninth Circuit in
Brown, grant sentence credit based on individualized evaluations of the
conditions of incarceration, and promulgate guidelines describing the
conditions of restraint that serve both the punitive and rehabilitative
goals of incarceration and merit credit under Section 3585. At a minimum, this resolution ensures that all defendants will receive uniform
treatment and resolves the current split in the circuits.
II.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: ASCERTAINING THE MEANING AND
INTENT OF

18 U.S.C.

SECTION

3585

Section 3585(b) governs awards of sentence credit for pre-trial detention."0 When defendants submit habeas corpus petitions seeking sentence credit for time spent in residential facilities as a condition of
bond, courts generally begin their analysis by interpreting this statute.
The outcome of the habeas corpus appeal hinges on this analysis. For
example, in United States v. Woods,"' the Tenth Circuit stated that a
court must first decide whether Section 3585 ever entitles a criminal
defendant to credit for pre-trial custody in a conditional-release environment before analyzing what constitutes official detention.2
Scholars employ several competing theories when attempting to interpret a statute's proper meaning. These theories include the "plain
meaning rule, ' 33 "purposivism, ' 3 4 "intentionalism, ' '35 and "practical
30.

18 U.S.C. § 3585.

31. 888 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1989).
32. Id. at 654-55.
33. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321 (1990). The "plain meaning rule," or textualism as Eskridge and
Frickey call it, suggests that the words of a statute alone convey its meaning. Id. at 340-45.
34. Id. at 332-39. Eskridge and Frickey offer this term to explain a second theory advanced
by legal scholars that legislators design each statute or law with a specific purpose or objective. Id.
at 333. According to the theory, the purpose determines the meaning of the statute. Id.
35. Id. at 325-32. Intentionalism is a theory that is extremely similar to purposivism. Id. at
325. The interpreter attempts to determine the legislature's intent in passing the law and to enforce it consistent with these aims. Id.
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reasoning."36 Each theory uses an objective set of criteria to ensure
proper interpretation of all statutes under all circumstances and to restrain the judiciary's interpretative freedom."7 This subpart examines
the courts' various interpretations of Section 3585 and the resulting disparity in defendants' treatment.
A.

Plain Meaning of 18 U.S.C. Section 3585

The starting point for statutory interpretation must be the language of the statute itself.3 8 Proponents of the "plain meaning rule"
argue that the applicability of a law should be based solely on the wording of the statute, as determined by its common-sense meaning.3 9 The
Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that clear statutory language
must be the source of the law.4 Proponents argue that the statute's
language provides the only unbiased standard by which the law's meaning can be determined because it prevents judicial freedom of interpretation.4 ' Additionally, proponents assert that only this method gives the
public the opportunity to know the law's requirements.4"
Courts interpreting Section 3585 must consider two questions: first,
whether the phrase "in custody" significantly differs from the term "in
official detention," and second, what qualifies as "official detention"
and thereby merits sentence credit.
1. "In Custody" Versus "In Official Detention"
When deciding whether to order sentence credit for certain pretrial detention, courts first consider whether the change in the language
of Section 3585,"3 adopted with the Crime Act,4 4 significantly impacts
the statute's approach to sentence credit for conditionally released pre36. Id. at 345-62. Eskridge and Frickey advance the practical reasoning approach to statutory
interpretation. Id. at 345. They suggest that the Supreme Court currently uses this approach,
which requires consideration of many influential factors. Id. Their theory is actually a combination
of the other single-factored theories but also weighs the political and social forces influencing the
decision to adopt the statute. Id.
37. Id. at 324-25.
38. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1831-34 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
39. Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 340-41 (cited in note 33).
40. Id. Justice Holmes said, "We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what
the statute means." Id. at 340 (quoting Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,12
Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899)). See also Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 341 (citing
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1977)).
41. Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 340.
42. Id.
43. See note 14 and accompanying text.
44. Pub.L. No. 98-473, §§ 212, 235, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1976, 1987, 2031.

1572

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1565

trial detainees.4 5 The original statute, Section 3568,46 granted sentence
credit to defendants "in custody, '47 whereas Section 3585 of the Crime
'
Act grants sentence credit to those "in official detention."48
No court has held that the change in language altered the meaning
of the statute.49 For example, in Mills v. Taylor,50 the Ninth Circuit
stated that the new language of Section 3585, "in official detention,"
was synonymous with Section 3568's" "in custody;" therefore, that court
found that Congress did not intend to change the types of situations
that merit sentence credit. 1 Similarly, in United States v. Woods,52 the
Tenth Circuit found the change in statutory language irrelevant for
purposes of awarding credit.53 The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have
agreed. 4
Although all circuit courts have examined the same statutory language when determining defendants' Section 3585 petitions, they have
reached opposite results. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have
ruled that defendants remanded to residential detention centers to
await trial are not in "official custody" or "official detention" and therefore are not entitled to sentence credit.5 5 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit
45. Id.
46. Section 3568 was the predecessor of Section 3585. See note 14.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (repealed 1987).
48. See note 14 and accompanying text.
49. The statute's legislative history neglects to provide any interpretative guidance and
therefore has invited the current dispute over the statute's intended meaning. As noted above, the
courts have ruled that the change is insignificant for sentence credit. Judge Butzner in the Fourth
Circuit contested this view, citing traditional rules of statutory interpretation-that a change in
language is indicative of a change in meaning or application. See Randall v. Whelan, 938 F.2d 522,
527-28 (4th Cir. 1991) (Butzner, J., dissenting). Judge Butzner stated that because the legislative
history is silent on the meaning of "official detention," courts should refer to prior sections of the
statute for guidance. Id. This approach is consistent with the traditional view of statutory interpretation. See Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05 at 103 (Clark,
Boardman, Callaghan, 5th ed. 1992), which states, "A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts
or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section
should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious
whole. Thus, it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed." Under
this analysis, the term "detention" should be afforded the same meaning throughout the Crime
Act. This would suggest that official detention only occurs when a defendant is detained by an
officer under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156. See Mills v. Taylor, 967 F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
50. 967 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1992).
51. Id. at 1399.
52. 888 F.2l 653 (10th Cir. 1989).
53. Id. at 655.
54. The Fourth Circuit consistently holds that the change in the statute has no bearing on
the awarding of sentence credit. See Randall v. Whelan, 938 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1991), and United
States v. Insley, 927 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1991). The Fifth Circuit has stated that "there is no meaningful distinction between 'in custody' and 'official detention.' "Pinedo v. United States, 955 F.2d
12, 14 (5th Cir. 1992).
55. See Randall, 938 F.2d at 524; Pinedo, 955 F.2d at 13; Woods, 888 F.2d at 655-56.
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held that the conditions of detention in residential facilities constitute
"official detention" and merit sentence credit.5 6
2. "Official Detention"-Only the Attorney General?
The second and more important question of statutory interpretation raised by Section 3585(b) is what constitutes "official detention."
Based on their interpretation of "official detention," many circuit
courts have denied sentence credit to pre-trial detainees for time spent
in treatment centers but have awarded sentence credit to postconviction detainees in the same facility.5 7 These courts contend that,

unless defendants are subject to the Attorney General's control, they
are not "in official detention" and cannot qualify for sentence credit
under Section 3585(b).
The inequities of these sentencing disparities are readily apparent.
For example, a defendant remanded to a halfway house by a judge in a
bail hearing would not be entitled to any credit for the time spent
awaiting trial, whereas a post-sentence individual remanded to the
same halfway house by the Attorney General would be granted sentence
credit. In Moreland v. United States,8 the conditionally released defendant was subject to twenty-four-hour-a-day detention for over two
weeks.59 The conditions of his confinement "mirrored those imposed on
jail inmates."60 Moreover, the defendant was remanded to a center that
also housed post-sentence individuals who did receive sentence credit
for their time spent in the center."1 The Eighth Circuit held that official
detention required that the defendant be subject to the control of the
Attorney General and thereby subject to federal penalties for escape.2
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit refused Moreland's credit request and
ruled that the conditions of the defendant's detainment, although identical to those of the post-sentence individuals,
were irrelevant for pur63
poses of calculating sentence credit.

Employing a similar analysis, the Fourth Circuit in Randall v.
Whelan" stated that the term "in custody" was essentially synonymous
56. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3568). See
also Mills, 967 F.2d 1387 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3585).
57. Woods, 888 F.2d at 656. See also Moreland v. United States, 968 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1992)
(en banc). This apparent inequity has led to several challenges under the Fifth Amendments
Equal Protection Clause. See note 4 and accompanying text.
58. 968 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1992).
59. Id. at 665. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 657.
62. Id. at 659-60.
63. Id. at 661.
64. 938 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1991).
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with "in official detention" and referred to the custodian's legal authority rather than the conditions of the defendant's confinement." The
Randall court suggested that the only common link between federal inmates housed under vastly different conditions is that they are all subject to the authority of the Attorney General. 6 Accordingly, that court
held that unless a defendant is under the Attorney General's control, he
is not "officially detained" and therefore is ineligible for sentence credit
under Section 3585.7

The courts that follow the Moreland and Randall line of analysis
base their denial of sentence credit solely on the jailor's identity.6 8
These courts suggest that because defendants who are released on a
condition of bond are still under the control of the court, they are not
"in official detention" and consequently do not qualify for sentence
credit. This result is inconsistent with a plain meaning interpretation of
the statute. The text of the statute does not specify that official detention requires the Attorney General's control; 69 therefore, a commonsense interpretation suggests that judges also are empowered to "officially detain" defendants. Furthermore, the distinction between detainment by a judge and by the Attorney General appears artificial and
irrelevant to a layperson. 70 For example, in Ramsey v. Brennan,7 ' the
Seventh Circuit admitted that any "normal English speaker" would
consider a defendant detained in a halfway house to be in custody.7
The circuit courts that follow this analysis offer no justification for the
distinction they recognize between detainment by a judge and detainment by the Attorney General. According to the courts, even though a
judge has'7 3the authority to detain the individual, this detention is not
"official.

This ridiculous distinction has prompted judges, defend-

65. Id. at 525. In Randall, the court refused to grant sentence credit to a prisoner because
the court remanded him to a drug treatment center, during which time he was not answerable to
the Attorney General. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 526.
68. See Starchild v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 973 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1992). See also
Ronchetti v.Richards, 790 F. Supp. 117 (N.D.W.V. 1992).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3585. See note 14.
70. The basic question is whether a judge can be vested with the authority to detain an
individual but be denied the power to determine whether that detention will be credited to an
ultimate sentence.
71. 878 F.2d 995 (7th Cir. 1989).
72. Id. at 996.
73. In United States v. Wilson, the Supreme Court ruled that only the Attorney General can
determine sentence credit and only after conviction. 112 S. Ct. 1351, 1355 (1992). Many have suggested that the judiciary should have concurrent jurisdiction. However, when defendants are remanded to detention facilities prior to conviction by judges, the defendants should receive credit
by appealing to the Attorney General.
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ants, and lawyers to argue that sentence credit should be granted to
conditionally released individuals. 4
In Brown v. Rison,8 the Ninth Circuit rejected the government's
contention that "detention" did not include conditional release programs.7 The Brown court defined the term "in custody" to include its
"ordinary and plain meaning": detention. 77 Accordingly, it awarded the
defendant credit for his time spent in a community treatment center by
holding that the restraints on one's liberty approaching incarceration 8
satisfied the "in custody" requirement of Section 3568.9
Similarly, in United States v. Davis,80 the District Court for the
District of Columbia granted sentence credit to the defendant for time
spent in a halfway house prior to conviction and for the time spent after conviction awaiting assignment to a correctional facility.8" The Davis court stated that the confinement conditions at the halfway house
satisfied the ordinary meaning of official detention. 2
Finally, in United States v. Wickman,8 3 Judge Lay of the Eighth
Circuit disagreed with the majority and explained in a dissent that the
plain meaning of "official detention" did not require the defendant to
be confined in a specific type of building or to be under the control of
the Attorney General. 4 Rather, he argued that a defendant was detained when he was remanded by a judge to any treatment facility and
was subjected to additional sanctions and penalties for failure to comply.88 According to Judge Lay, official detention only implied a significant loss of liberty; thus, the conditionally released defendant deserved
sentence credit.8 8
87
Reaching a similar conclusion, the dissenting judges in Moreland,
including Judge Lay, offered an alternative interpretation of the phrase
74. See United States v.Wickman, 955 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1992); Moreland v.United States,
968 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
75. 895 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1990).
76. Id. at 536.
77. Id. Specifically, the court stated, "[T]he conditions of Brown's confinement... fall
convincingly within both the plain meaning and the obvious intent of 'custody' as it is used in section
3568." Id. The court held that "custody" included enforced residence at a drug treatment center
when the conditions approach incarceration. Id.
78. Id.
79. Section 3568 is the predecessor statute to § 3585. See note 14 and accompanying
discussion.
80. 763 F. Supp. 638 (D.D.C. 1991).
81. Id. at 644.
82. Id.
83. 955 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1992).
84. Id. at 594.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 595.
87. Moreland, 968 F.2d at 664 (Heaney, Lay, McMillan, Arnold, and Gibson, JJ., dissenting).
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"in official detention." The judges suggested that, because the defendant was remanded to a residential community treatment center that acted as an agent of the criminal system, his time in the treatment center
qualified as "official detention," and he therefore deserved sentence
credit. 8 According to the dissenters, whenever defendants are remanded to a facility recognized by the federal system, 18 U.S.C. Section
3585 commands the Attorney General to grant them credit towards
their sentences.8
These interpretations of Section 3585's language are consistent
with the "plain meaning" that an individual generally would afford the
statute. Others may argue, however, that the language of the statute is
inherently ambiguous; therefore, its meaning cannot be ascertained definitively. These individuals contend that the language is susceptible to
different interpretations based on context and the interpreter's value
system,9 0 and therefore requires judges to focus on the legislature's intent in and purpose of passing Section 3585. 91
B. Purpose and Intent of 18 U.S.C. Section 3585
The courts often employ a second approach when interpreting statutes. "Intentionalism" requires courts to determine the legislature's in92
tent in enacting a statute and then to apply the law accordingly.
Many scholars consider intentionalism to be the only legitimate theory
of interpretation because the courts are agents of the legislature and
should attempt to fulfill the legislative goals.93
A related approach is "purposivism," in which courts attempt to
interpret a statute based on the legislature's purpose in adopting the
law.9 4 This theory rests on the assumption that the legislature "passes
every law with a specific purpose or objective, and that by identifying
that purpose, the court successfully will apply the law. 5
88.

Id. at 665.

89. Id.
90. Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 342-43 (cited in note 33). This argument assumes that the political leanings of the interpreter will influence his or her interpretation of the

statute. For example, in the instant case, a judge who is extremely concerned with prisoners' constitutional rights is more likely to grant sentence credit than a judge who is worried about the
effect of crime on society.
91. Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 325-332.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 326.
94. Professor Max Radin suggested this approach in Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1930), and in Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 388
(1942).
95. Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 332-33 (cited in note 33) (citing Henry M.
Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process:Basic Problems in the Making and Application
of Law 166-67 (Cambridge, 1958)).
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Unfortunately, it often is impossible to discover the legislature's intent or purpose for enacting a statute. Legislative history, the records
designed to give researchers insight into the impetus for the legislation,
often is incomplete 6 and can be imprecise. 7 Critics argue, therefore,
that both intentionalism and purposivism fail to provide a proper standard for statutory interpretation because they, like textualism, enable
judges to make ad hoc determinations about the law. 8
Although the courts have tried to determine whether Congress intended to grant sentence credit to defendants under Section 3585 for
time spent in residential detention centers prior to trial, 99 they have
realized that the legislative history offers little insight. For example, in
his Wickman dissent, Judge Lay argued that the legislature's intent is
determinative in construing the meaning of "official detention," but he
stated that the history of Section 3585 was too scant to provide insight
into legislative objectives.10 0 He argued, however, that the Bail Reform
Act's0 1 goal to increase the number of individuals who received sentence credit and the conditions of incarceration that merited credit indicates that Congress intended Section 3585 to grant sentence credit to
conditionally released individuals whose liberty was significantly
impinged. 102
Congress probably did not intend to deny credit to individuals incarcerated with severe liberty restraints. In fact, the legislature probably did not consider granting sentence credit for time spent in
residential detention facilities when the Crime Act originally was
promulgated in 1984. This lack of foresight by Congress highlights the
weakness in the "intentionalism" and "purposivism" approaches to
statutory interpretation: the interpreter has no idea of the legislature's
actual intention and is left to determine how Congress would respond
to this issue. Given the current condition of federal penal institutions
and the interest in protecting the public without unduly trammelling
96. Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 328-31. In part, legislative history is always
incomplete because it is written only by certain individuals who voted for the law. Although perhaps successful in conveying both their intent in passing the law and the discussions prior to the
vote, the history cannot provide a definitive view of the entire legislative body's intent.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 327-29, 333-39.
99. See Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653
(10th Cir. 1989); Randall v. Whelan, 938 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1991); and Moreland v. United States,
968 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
100. United States v. Wickman, 955 F.2d 592, 593 (8th Cir. 1992) (Lay, J., dissenting).
101. See Bail Reform Act (cited in note 3).
102. Wickman, 955 F.2d at 594 (Lay, J., dissenting). One can infer through the history of the
statute that Congress intended to increase the class available to receive credit because this has
been the trend since Congress first granted sentence credit for pre-trial custody in 1960 for instances when a minimum sentence was mandated.
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prisoners' constitutional rights, Congress probably would have commanded courts to base their credit decisions on the conditions of the
defendant's incarceration.
C. PracticalReasoning
Professors Eskridge and Frickey criticize the traditional approaches to statutory interpretation for failing to provide "objective
and determinative answers" free from the influence of prevailing values.10 3 They suggest that interpretation of a statute is impossible without considering outside influences. 0 4 According to Professors Eskridge
and Frickey, the United States Supreme Court actually interprets statutes through a system of practical reasoning;10 5 rather than attempting
to disassociate themselves from outside forces, the Court tries to interpret statutes "reasonably.' 1 6 The Justices consider a wide variety of
factors including statutory language, intent and purpose of the statute,
related statutory policies, current political values, and fundamental
fairness. 0
For example, the Brown court analyzed the language of the statute
and considered both the BOP's statement on sentence credit and the
other circuits' opinions denying credit to pre-trial detainees, yet the
court chose to disregard the majority approach and grant credit. 0 8 The
court based this decision on its concept of fairness, stating that "in custody" should not be interpreted to "exclude enforced residence under
conditions approaching incarceration." 0 9 The Brown court held that
denial of sentence credit'to an individual whose liberty was significantly
infringed was unfair." 0
The practical reasoning approach to statutory interpretation is the
appropriate mode of analysis for Section 3585 for several reasons. The
courts cannot consider only the text of the statute, especially when they
interpret the language ambiguously. The reasonable interpretation of 18
U.S.C. Section 3585 demands that pre-trial detainees who are restrained at the same facilities as post-sentence detainees be afforded
the same rights and granted sentence credit for time spent remanded to
103. Eskridge ;nd Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 345 (cited in note 33).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 345-48.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 348-52. This approach is similar to other methods employed by many of the
courts. When interpreting § 3585, the courts weigh a variety of factors to determine if credit is
warranted. See discussion in text accompanying notes 15-18.
108. Brown; 895 F.2d at 535-36.
109. Id. at 536.
110. Id.
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the residential facility. The BOP, however, refuses to acknowledge and
correct this obvious inequity.
III.

CRITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CREDIT DECISION

All courts examine the statutory language of Section 3585 but
rarely conclude their analyses at that point. Many courts that employ
the practical reasoning approach to their interpretation of Section 3585
attempt to justify their decisions by using three other factors: the conditions of incarceration, the BOP's policy on sentence credit for conditional release programs, and a Fifth Amendment equal protection
analysis. This Part evaluates the various courts' positions on each of
these factors and suggests alternative interpretations that would result
in extremely different but more equitable outcomes.
A.

Conditions of Incarceration

Most circuit courts contend that the degree of incarceration and
the conditions of restraint are irrelevant for determining whether a defendant is "in official detention" and thereby entitled to sentence
credit."' These courts disregard the true issue raised by conditional release programs: whether a particular defendant's liberty was sufficiently
restricted by the conditions of his confinement to warrant sentence
credit for the time remanded to the treatment center.
For example, in United States v. Insley," 2 the defendant, a single
female, was remanded to the custody of her parents."

3

The Fourth Cir-

cuit restricted the defendant to her parents' home except when she
needed to attend church and work. 1

4

After sentencing, the defendant

sought sentence credit for the time spent conditionally released." 5 The
court rejected the defendant's petition, stating that her conditional release did not constitute custody.""
The Fourth Circuit further explored this analysis in Randall v.
Whelan," 7 in which the court stated that courts should not determine
sentence credit by an evaluation of the regulations and physical constraints on a conditionally released prisoner." 8 The court explained
111. See, for example, Randall v. Whelan, 938 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1991); Moreland v. United
States, 968 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653 (10th Cir.
1989).
112. 927 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1991).
113. Id. at 186.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 938 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1991).
118. Id. at 525-26.

1580

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1565

that this approach would "mire the judiciary in a swamp of factual and
circumstantial details that would likely produce inconsistent and
standardless decisions."' 1 9 The Randall court therefore deferred to
what it corsidered the more knowledgeable BOP and enforced the
BOP's policy that denied sentence credit to all conditionally released
prisoners. 120
Similarly, in United States v. Woods, 12 1 the Tenth Circuit ruled
that "in official detention" does not mean stipulations or conditions imposed upon release but requires complete, physical imprisonment in a
place of confinement. 22 The court then implied, however, that it denied
the defendant credit because the restrictions at the halfway house to
which Woods was remanded did not equal the deprivation of liberty
experienced by an individual incarcerated in a jail-type facility. 123 The
court's analysis implies that it used a balancing test, like the one used
by the Ninth Circuit in Brown, to determine whether the conditions of
restraint were sufficiently similar to those in a jail facility to warrant
sentence credit.
The Randall court's justification for denying the defendant credit
is ludicrous. By refusing to consider the circumstances of incarceration,
the judiciary currently is producing the "inconsistent and standardless
decisions" that the Fourth Circuit sought to avoid. Moreover, the
Woods court's own analysis indicates that when determining whether
sentence credit is merited, it is proper and necessary to consider the
conditions of incarceration. 2 4 In that case, the court considered the degree of restraint imposed on Woods during his incarceration when deciding whether to award him credit. Finally, under the standard
advanced by the Woods court, the defendants in Moreland in the
Eighth Circuit, 25 Brown in the Ninth, 1 26 and Davis in the D.C. District
Court 127 would have received credit because they were subject to "complete physical incarceration in a place of confinement."' 2 These defendants were subject to twenty-four hour confinement. Under the
119. Id. at 525. It is ironic that the Fourth Circuit suggested that the current standard used
by the courts results in even-handed sentencing. As evidenced by the cases cited, the varying approaches of the circuits result in similar inequities.
120. Id. at 526.
121. 888 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1989).
122. Id. at 655.
123. Id. at 656.
124. Id. at 655-56.
125. Moreland, 968 F.2d 655. See text accompanying notes 167-176 for a detailed discussion
of the conditions of Moreland's incarceration.
126. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1990). See text accompanying notes 19-25 for
details of Brown's confinement.
127. United States v. Davis, 763 F. Supp. 638 (D.D.C. 1991).
128. Woods, 888 F.2d at 655.
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Woods analysis, the Tenth Circuit should allow defendants to earn sentence credit when faced with similar conditions. 12 9 Despite the language
of its opinion, however, the Tenth Circuit probably would not have
granted these defendants credit because they were not remanded to
federal penal institutions.
Many courts suggest that they are making credit determinations
based on conditions of incarceration but are not willing to adopt the
balancing approach articulated by the Ninth Circuit, which weighs the
degree of restraint that a residential facility imposes on a detainee's
freedom when deciding whether that defendant deserves sentence
credit. Most courts, however, grant credit only if the defendant was remanded to a penal institution. By contrast, in United States v.
Wickman, Judge Lay suggested in a vigorous dissent that "official detention" does not require "prison-like confinement" and that restraint
of a defendant's liberty satisfies the statute's requirements. 130 Judge
Lay argued that even house arrest satisfies "official detention" and
qualifies for credit.''
In United States v. Davis,13 2 the District of Columbia's District

Court granted the defendant sentence credit for the time she spent in a
halfway house awaiting trial."" The court distinguished the Tenth Circuit's denial of credit in Woods,' stating that the conditions of Davis's
confinement approached those of incarceration. 5 Davis was incarcerated twenty-four hours a day and faced prosecution if she left the
center for more than two hours at a time. 36 The Davis court ended its
opinion by stating: "The conditions of confinement at the halfway
house fall under the ordinary and obvious meaning of official detention. 137 Although the court agreed that the BOP's position deserved
deference, the court rejected that interpretation. 38
This bright-line rule exaggerates the inequities in the federal criminal justice system. The Bail Reform Act sought to ensure that individuals who were sentenced to serve the same amount of time did not
receive disparate treatment. Section 3585 clearly states that individuals
in "official custody" should receive credit toward their sentence. Indi129.

See text accompanying notes 167-76, 19-27, and 132-38 for discussion of these cases.

130. United States v. Wickman, 955 F.2d 592, 595 (8th Cir. 1992) (Lay, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 595 n.3 (citing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that equate a day in prison with
one of home detention).
132. 763 F. Supp. 638 (D.D.C. 1991).
133. Id. at 639.
134. Woods, 888 F.2d 653.
135. Davis, 763 F. Supp. at 640.
136. Id. at 639.
137. Id. at 644.
138. Id.
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viduals at halfway houses often are detained under restrictive conditions that mirror or exceed those at some federal correctional facilities.
Courts should base credit determinations on the degree to which an individual's liberty was infringed by the conditions of his incarceration,
not on the obtuse distinction between the authority of a judge and the
Attorney General.
B. Bureau of Prisons' Statement
When deciding whether to award sentence credit, the courts also
consider the BOP's position on sentence credit for conditionally released defendants. Because the BOP is the administrative agency in
charge of the federal penal system, the federal circuit courts often defer
to it by implementing the agency's policies."3 9 Presently, the BOP denies sentence credit to all defendants conditionally released prior to
trial 40 and justifies this wholesale denial by explaining that "the degree
of restraint is not sufficient to constitute custody."''
The BOP's statement does not indicate that custody or "official detention" requires an individual to be subject to the Attorney General's
control to earn credit; rather, the BOP's statement suggests that credit
is denied solely because the degree of restraint is not sufficient.'42 Although the BOP's statement purports to deny sentence credit in all
cases, the specific language implies that the conditions of confinement
are determinative. 43 Yet the majority of circuit courts disagree.
For example, the Seventh Circuit in Ramsey v. Brennan4 4 stated

that although detention in a halfway house constituted custody, the
court would defer to the BOP's policy because the statute was ambiguous and subject to various interpretations. 45 Accordingly, the court denied the defendant's petition for credit. 14 The court did not consider
139. See, for example, Randall v. Whelan, 938 F.2d 522; Moreland, 968 F.2d 655.
140. See Randall, 938 F.2d at 524.
141. Id. at 525; Bureau of Prisons' Program Statement 5880.24 (5). Specifically, the Bureau
of Prisons' Statement provides: "Time spent in residence in a residential community center...
[under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3146] as a condition of bail or bond, including the Pretrial
Services Program, (18 U.S.C. § 3152-54), is not creditable as jail time since the degree of restraint
provided by residence in a community center is not sufficient restraint to constitute custody
within the meaning or intent of 18 U.S.C. § 3568." (original emphasis omitted) (emphasis added).
Additionally, the statement defines "in custody" as "physical incarceration in a jail-type institution or facility."

142. Id.
143. A majority of the circuits consider only the first part of the statement and have ruled
that the BOP's statement is a wholesale bar to sentence credit for an individual detained in a
residential facility.
144. 878 F.2d 995 (7th Cir. 1989).

145. Id. at 996.
146.

Id.
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the conditions of the defendant's release, but rather stated that the
BOP's statement constituted a wholesale 14 7bar to granting sentence
credit to conditionally released defendants.

Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Randall v. Whelan stated that the
BOP's policy clearly prohibited the granting of sentence credit for time
spent in residential facilities. 148 The court, citing the Seventh Circuit's
position in Ramsey,1 4 1 stated that courts should defer to the BOP's
greater knowledge of federal penal policy.150
By contrast, in Brown, the Ninth Circuit stated that, although it
owed deference to the BOP, the agency's definition of custody was unreasonable because it failed to include enforced residence under conditions approaching incarceration.' 5 ' The court acknowledged the BOP's

statement regarding sentence credit but refused to follow the BOP's
policy.1'

2

The Brown court therefore granted the defendant sentence

credit for the 306 days he spent incarcerated at the drug treatment
center 53 under extremely restrictive conditions. The Ninth Circuit continues to ignore the BOP's statement and grants credit for time spent
in residential facilities as a condition of bond.'5
Similarly, the District Court in United States v. Davis 5 also ignored the BOP's statement and granted the defendant credit for time
spent in a halfway house. 6 The Davis court chided the Seventh Circuit
for denying credit in Ramsey simply because they deferred to the BOP
without recognizing that the BOP regularly grants credit to post-sentence individuals who were detained in the same facilities.' 57 The Davis
court stated that, at best, the BOP's position was unreasonable, and, at
15 8
worst, created an equal protection violation.
The BOP's statement implies that if the conditions of incarceration
approach those of a jail-type facility, then the defendant deserves sen147. Id.
148. Randall, 938 F.2d at 523.
149. Ramsey, 878 F.2d at 996. See text accompanying notes 144-47.
150. Randall, 938 F.2d at 525.
151. Brown, 895 F.2d at 536.
152. Id. The court specifically found that the highly restrictive conditions of Brown's confinement were sufficient to merit credit under § 3585.
153. Id. See notes 19-26 and accompanying text for a complete description of the conditions
of Brown's incarceration.
154. See Mills v. Taylor, 967 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Grady v. Crabtree,958 F.2d
874 (9th Cir. 1992); Smith v. United States, 1992 WL 55799 (9th Cir. 1992); and Tyree v. Taylor,
965 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1992). Under California law, the Attorney General now must grant sentence
credit for time spent in a residential facility if the conditions of restraint approach incarceration.
155. 763 F. Supp. 638 (D.D.C. 1991).
156. Id. at 641-45.
157. Id. at 643. See Ramsey, 878 F.2d at 996. See notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
158. Davis, 763 F. Supp. at 643-44.
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tence credit. The exact language of the statement suggests that the degree of incarceration is determinative. 159 This seemingly obvious
interpretation contradicts the bright-line rule advanced by the BOP
that no credit be given for pre-trial detention in treatment centers.
Through its statement, the BOP unintentionally invites the current balancing approach employed by the Brown court.160 The conditions of
confinement at certain centers approach or exceed those faced by inmates in federal institutions. Thus, the BOP essentially states that sentence credit determinations should be based on the degree to which a
defendant's liberty is impinged.
C. Equal Protection Analysis
Courts also consider whether denying sentence credit is consistent
with the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause when they examine defendants' credit appeals. The Equal Protection Clause 1e ' guarantees that "similarly situated" individuals will be treated equally
under the law. 62 If denying credit would violate the Equal Protection
Clause, courts will grant it immediately.
At least three circuits have entertained equal protection challenges
163
to the BOP's refusal to grant credit for pre-trial residential detention.
Two circuits have held that the divergent legal status of the pre- and
post-sentence detainees provided a rational basis for the different treatment.'
In Johnson v. Smith, 6 5 however, the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that the disparate treatment violated the Equal Protection Clause. 6 6
In both Moreland v. United States 6 7 and United States v.
Woods,6 8 the defendants were conditionally released to halfway houses
to await their trial.6 9 These halfway houses sheltered both pre-trial and
159. The language of the BOP's statement is clear because "the degree of restraint provided
by residence in a community center is not sufficient restraint to constitute custody." Bureau Program Statement No. 5880.24(5). See note 141 and accompanying text.
160. See notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
161. U.S. Const., Amend. V.
162. Id.
163. See Moreland v. United States, 968 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v.
Woods, 888 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1334 (11th Cir. 1983).
164. See Moreland, 968 F.2d at 660; Woods, 888 F.2d at 656-57.
165. 696 F.2d 1334 (11th Cir. 1983).
166. Id. Although the court found that the treatment violated the Equal Protection Clause, it
suggested that the defendants' different legal status may have justified the disparity in treatment.
The state failed, however, to present this evidence to the trial court, and the circuit court refused
to entertain it on appeal.
167. 968 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
168. 888 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1989).
169. Moreland, 968 F.2d at 656; Woods, 888 F.2d at 654.
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post-sentence prisoners. 17 The prisoners, regardless of status, were subject to the same treatment and conditions."' The post-sentence prisoners received sentence credit for the time they spent in the facility, but
the pre-trial prisoners, including the two defendants, were denied sentence credit for their period of incarceration.1 72 The defendants appealed the denial of credit, arguing that it violated the Equal
1 73
Protection Clause.
In these two cases, the courts began their analyses by determining
whether the two classes of individuals were similarly situated.1 7 4 Both
courts ruled that the two groups were not similarly situated because the
post-sentence prisoners were subject to the authority of the Attorney
General and the conditionally released pre-trial defendants were subject only to the jurisdiction of the courts. 76 Accordingly, the courts
ruled that denying credit to the pre-trial detainees did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.1 6 These courts based their ultimate decisions
on the previously discussed artificial distinction between a judge's and
the Attorney General's respective powers to "officially detain" a
defendant.
By contrast, in Johnson v. Smith the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
the defendant, a pre-trial detainee subject to exactly the same treatment as post-sentence prisoners, deserved sentence credit. 1 7 The court
ruled that the two groups were similarly situated and that failure to
grant the defendant sentence credit would violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 7 s The court limited its holding to this specific case, however,
because the state failed to offer a rational reason for the disparate
179
treatment in the trial court.
The District Court for the District of Columbia also suggested that
the BOP's policy of denying credit created an equal protection violation
170. Moreland, 968 F.2d at 660; Woods, 888 F.2d at 655.
171. Moreland, 968 F.2d at 660; Woods, 888 F.2d at 655.
172. Moreland, 968 F.2d at 660; Woods, 888 F.2d at 655.
173. Moreland, 968 F.2d at 660; Woods, 888 F.2d at 655.
174. See Moreland, 968 F.2d at 660; Woods, 888 F.2d at 665. The Equal Protection analysis
is required when those similarly situated are subject to disparate treatment. Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 678 (Foundation, 10th ed. 1980). If two groups are similarly situated, then the
government must advance a rational reason to justify the discrepancy in treatment. Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
175. Moreland, 968 F.2d at 660; Woods, 888 F.2d at 656.
176. Moreland, 968 F.2d at 660; Woods, 888 F.2d at 656.
177. 696 F.2d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 1991).
178. Id. at 1338.
179. Johnson, 696 F.2d at 1338. The court denied the state the opportunity to present evidence justifying the different treatment on appeal because "absent special circumstances, defenses
not presented and for which proof is not offered in the trial court cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal." Id.
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in United States v. Davis.8 0 The court highlighted the potential constitutional violation by stating that, because both are subject to the same
confinement conditions and the same penalties for escaping, defendants
detained while awaiting trial are similarly situated to post-sentence defendants."' The court held that because the government advanced no
logical reason for the distinction, denying credit raised equal protection
questions.182
Individuals are not dissimilarly situated simply because one individual is sent to a treatment center by a judge and the other by the
Attorney General. They are treated identically and subject to exactly
the same restrictive conditions once at the facility. The state should be
required to offer more than just the identity of the defendants' jailers
to deny these defendants sentence credit. Defendants are not concerned
with whether a judge or the Attorney General is responsible for ordering treatment; their freedom is infringed to the same extent in either
situation.
Most courts' approach to sentence credit denies defendants their
freedom and the security of knowing that the time they spent incarcerated will be credited toward their ultimate sentence. The courts' differing interpretations of the statutory text and their analyses of the other
factors have resulted in extremely disparate treatment for similarly-situated individuals. The time individuals spend incarcerated for committing the same federal crime should not differ according to the
jurisdiction of their indiscretion.
IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The current confusion regarding the proper interpretation of Section 3585 results in extremely disparate treatment for individuals. A
defendant who is remanded to a federal facility to await trial receives
sentence credit, whereas an individual who is conditionally released,
subject to perhaps more restrictive conditions than the first individual,
is denied credit. Moreover, a defendant sent to a drug rehabilitation
center in California receives sentence credit although a defendant sent
to a similar facility in Tennessee is denied credit. These arbitrary distinctions primarily result from focusing on the identity of the defendant's jailor, rather than on the restraints on the defendant's liberty.
The courts should adopt an approach for determining whether to grant
sentence credit that examines the degree of the defendant's incarceration, not just the jailor's identity.
180. Davis, 763 F. Supp. at 643-44.
181. Id. at 644.
182. Id.
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The Brown approach is more consistent with the apparent intent
and policy of the legislature in adopting 18 U.S.C. Section 3585. The
legislature did not explicitly restrict the meaning of "in official detention" only to include time when the defendant was in the Attorney
General's custody. The statute's plain language suggests that time
served in a residential detention center should be credited towards the
defendant's ultimate sentence. Upon close evaluation, the justifications
offered by most circuit courts for denying pre-trial detainees sentence
credit are weak. The differing authority of a judge and the Attorney
General is not so disparate as to warrant the extreme diversity of position. Moreover, the policy of granting sentence credit to individuals remanded to a treatment center after sentencing and denying it to an
individual remanded to the same treatment center prior to trial is an
equal protection violation.
An approach based on the degree of incarceration comports with
the text of Section 3585 and the legislature's apparent intent and policy
in adopting the statute. This approach would ensure defendants that
their term of imprisonment would be reduced by any time they have
spent in federal or state custody as a result of their offenses.
This approach may meet resistance from most courts. Judges might
argue that making such determinations and administering them will result in as much disparity in treatment as the current system. The practical problems of determining what type of detention merits credit,
however, require only that the Supreme Court or the Attorney General
delineate the time and freedom restrictions necessary to comport with
federal guidelines of detention. The creation of such standards could
actually decrease the number of habeas petitions for credit because the
facilities entitled to federal credit can be licensed, and a list of eligible
centers can be made available to federal judges and attorneys for use
during bail hearings.
Additionally, the courts face increasingly overcrowded jails, which,
in many cases, are subject to court orders to decrease the prison population.1 3 Therefore, these courts may remand to residential detention
facilities individuals who otherwise would have been refused bail and
sent to a federal detention facility. The individual's freedom is being
severely restricted in an attempt to protect society, and the individual
is receiving treatment to enable him to become a more productive member of society. The centers foster the deterrence, retributive, and reha183. The statistics cited in United States v. Wickman, 955 F.2d 592, 595 (8th Cir. 1992)
(Lay, J., dissenting), show the following: the local jail occupancy rate in 1989 was 108%, 26% of
jails were under federal or state order to limit the number of inmates, and 51% resorted to detaining prisoners in other facilities due to overcrowding. Bureau of Justice Statistics Survey (June 30,
1989).
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bilitative goals of incarceration; 8 4 therefore, the individual should

receive sentence credit.
Moreover, the current overcrowding in the jails demands innovative responses by both the judiciary and the BOP. Alternative sanctions
that will further the current goals of incarceration must be developed
and offered. Certain jurisdictions currently use programs like electronic
monitoring and house arrest, which may become more widespread if
proven successful. 185 Designing additional programs and facilities that
will protect society from dangerous individuals but also will enable the
individuals to receive treatment for substance abuse problems or participate in supervised work programs will be more beneficial to society
than simply filling slots in a federal penitentiary.
In the near future, the Attorney General and the courts will have
no choice but to consider these proposed options. The current conditions in prisons suggest that these alternatives, if not voluntarily chosen, will be foisted upon prison officials by court order or through
prisoner uprisings demanding action.
V.

CONCLUSION

A person whose freedom is restricted cares little about the identity
of the jailor. The language of 18 U.S.C. Section 3585 commands the
Attorney General to grant sentence credit to an individual who is "in
official detention."""' The language of the statute appears unambiguous:
a defendant is entitled to credit for time served in "official detention."
The meaning afforded this phrase by most circuit courts precludes
many defendants from receiving appropriate credit. This interpretation
results in serious inequities that undermine the fairness of the criminal
justice system.
The Supreme Court should terminate the current confusion among
the circuit courts and definitively answer the question of whether individuals released to residential detention facilities prior to trial are entitled to sentence credit. The Court should adopt the Brown approach
and make credit determinations based on conditions of incarceration
that should be the guidepost for determining whether an individual is
in custody and therefore entitled to sentence credit.
184. Treatment centers seek to enable prisoners to return to civilian life without substance
abuse problems.
185. See Wickman, 955 F.2d at 595 (Lay, J., dissenting). Judge Lay argued that individuals
incarcerated under such programs should be granted sentence credit. In Judge Lay's vigorous dissent in Wickman, he suggested that the defendant, subject to electronic monitoring while under
house arrest, was in custody and deserved credit.
186. See notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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The conditions of incarceration and the restraints on freedom
should determine whether an individual deserves sentence credit. The
United States criminal justice system is based on the belief that an individual should be punished for his crimes. But an accusation of guilt
does not destroy a defendant's constitutional rights; whether a person's
liberty is infringed prior to or after trial should be irrelevant for purposes of sentence credit. Whenever an individual is subject to severe
liberty restrictions, whether it be at the command of the court or the
Attorney General, that person should receive credit for that time. A
balancing approach is appropriate to determine what qualifies as "detention"; the question should not revolve around the definition of
"official."
The conditions of incarceration that constitute detention should be
determined by the Supreme Court or the Attorney General. The Court
should formulate guidelines delineating what conditions will be considered "official detention" and thereby deserve sentence credit. This approach to sentence credit would produce more consistent rulings and
equitable results.
MaryEllen Sullivan

